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Few concepts are more central to the study of face recognition than holistic processing.
Progress toward understanding holistic processing is challenging because the term “holis-
tic” has many meanings, with different researchers addressing different mechanisms and
favoring different measures.While in principle the use of different measures should provide
converging evidence for a common theoretical construct, convergence has been slow to
emerge. We explore why this is the case. One challenge is that “holistic processing” is
often used to describe both a theoretical construct and a measured effect, which may not
have a one-to-one mapping. Progress requires more than greater precision in terminology
regarding different measures of holistic processing or different hypothesized mechanisms
of holistic processing. Researchers also need to be explicit about what meaning of holis-
tic processing they are investigating so that it is clear whether different researchers are
describing the same phenomenon or not. Face recognition differs from object recognition,
and not all meanings of holistic processing are equally suited to help us understand that
important difference.
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For years, holistic processing has been used to explain what
makes face recognition special. Unfortunately, many studies pro-
vide only verbal descriptions of holistic processing and there is
growing consensus that the concept is too loosely defined. A well-
known limitation of verbal descriptions is that the same word
can mean different things to different readers (e.g., Hintzman,
1990), and “holistic processing” is no exception. While there have
been attempts to operationalize holistic processing mechanisti-
cally, using computational models defined mathematically or by
simulation (Wenger and Townsend, 2001; Richler et al., 2008a;
Fific and Townsend, 2010; Mack et al., 2011; Gold et al., 2012), this
is just one important step.
Consider a recent paper by Gold et al. (2012). They com-
pared performance matching individual face parts to performance
matching whole faces. Contrast was staircased for the various
parts and whole faces independently. An integration index was
calculated as sensitivity for the whole face divided by the sum of
sensitivities for parts. Based on an ideal observer model, an index
greater than one indicates superoptimal integration – matching
the whole face would be literally greater than the sum of its parts.
No evidence for superoptimal integration was found. The authors
concluded that faces are not processed holistically, contrary to
many claims. The generality of this claim hinges on how holistic
processing is defined. Gold et al.’s integration index is consistent
with one proposed meaning of holistic processing – perceptual
integration of parts into a unitary whole – but this may not be
relevant to alternative meanings.
We have singled out Gold et al. (2012) for both its strengths and
weaknesses. On the one hand, it exemplifies what we hope to see
as a growing trend in the field: they developed and tested a pre-
cise computational definition of holistic processing. On the other
hand, it highlights a recurring challenge. While the multiplicity of
meanings of holistic processing is often acknowledged in reviews
and theoretical articles (e.g., Gauthier and Tarr, 2002; Maurer et al.,
2002; Kimchi and Amishav, 2010), a majority of papers only use
one meaning of holistic processing but draw general conclusions
that may erroneously span all possible meanings.
Here, we first discuss measures and mechanisms commonly
associated with holistic processing. The term “holistic” sometimes
refers to a theoretical position regarding mechanisms. Differ-
ent proposed mechanisms can be “holistic” in different respects,
yet the same term is used for all of them. Other times, “holis-
tic” refers to some measured behavior within specific tasks. The
same term is applied to different measures, even though they
may be capturing different things. We next highlight the var-
ious potential meanings of holistic processing. We discuss the
importance of being explicit about those meanings to ensure that
we do not confuse different phenomena, independently of the
proposed mechanisms that may ultimately explain them, and to
guide predictions about which measures might be expected to
converge.
MULTIPLE MEASURES AND MECHANISMS
A review of the literature reveals at least a dozen different tasks
that ostensibly measure holistic processing of faces. The two most
popular are the part-whole task and the composite task. In the
part-whole task, holistic processing is measured as better recog-
nition of a feature (e.g., eyes) when that feature is presented in
the context of a whole face versus when it is presented in isolation
(Tanaka and Farah, 1993). In the sequential matching compos-
ite task (Farah et al., 1998), participants judge whether one face
half (e.g., top) of two sequentially presented faces is the same or
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different while ignoring the other face half (e.g., bottom). Holistic
processing is measured as interference from the task-irrelevant
part, which is attenuated by misalignment.
Some prominent debates revolve around whether or not ver-
sions of these various tasks are even appropriate for measuring
holistic processing in the first place (e.g., partial versus complete
composite task, Gauthier and Bukach, 2007 versus McKone and
Robbins, 2007; part-whole task, Leder and Carbon, 2005). A more
recent question has been whether these measures tap into the same
construct by considering the correlation between performance on
these tasks. Some have found a correlation (DeGutis et al., 2013).
Others have not (Wang et al., 2012).
One important goal of using and comparing measures of holis-
tic processing is to test hypotheses about the mechanism(s) giving
rise to holistic recognition. Numerous mechanisms have been
proposed (Figure 1). The most commonly cited is that faces are
recognized holistically because faces are represented as undiffer-
entiated wholes. Face parts are “glued” together into a unitary
perceptual representation or “face template” (e.g., Young et al.,
1987; Tanaka and Farah, 1993; Farah et al., 1998; Maurer et al.,
2002).
An alternative “configural” view is that representations about
individual face parts and their configuration are used to rec-
ognize faces, with configural information particularly dominant
for upright faces. Holistic processing then reflects explicit rep-
resentation of spatial relations between features (e.g., Diamond
and Carey, 1986; Rhodes et al., 1993; Searcy and Bartlett, 1996;
Leder and Bruce, 2000). Kimchi and colleagues proposed that nei-
ther featural nor configural information dominates upright face
perception, but that holistic processing emerges from interactive
processing between the two (Amishav and Kimchi, 2010; Kimchi
and Amishav, 2010). Fific and Townsend (2010) proposed that
holistic processing reflects parallel coactive processing of multiple
features and possibly their configurations.
Alternatively,holistic processing could reflect a perceptual strat-
egy of processing all parts together that becomes automatized for
categories for which people have extensive individuation experi-
ence, like faces (Wong and Gauthier, 2010; Richler et al., 2011c,d).
Although independent part representations are available, exper-
tise with faces engenders limited flexibility in weighting face parts
during experimental tasks that require participants to treat faces
unnaturally, as when instructed to ignore one face part.
FIGURE 1 | Framework for approaching the study of holistic
processing.Tasks used to measure holistic processing cluster into
different possible meanings. The partial design (Robbins and McKone,
2007) and complete design (Richler et al., 2008b) of the composite task
and the old/new configuration task (Tanaka and Sengco, 1997) measure
failures of selective attention and to some extent sensitivity to
configuration; the Thatcher illusion (Thompson, 1980) and the face
inversion effect (Yin, 1969) measure sensitivity to configuration; iHybrid
(Miellet et al., 2011) measures the use of global information sampling; The
blurred/scrambled task measures both global information sampling and
sensitivity to configuration (Hayward et al., 2008); An integration index
(Gold et al., 2012) and the Part/whole task (Tanaka and Farah, 1993)
measure whether the whole is more than the sum of its parts; the
component versus configural Garner paradigm (Amishav and Kimchi, 2010)
measures integrality of features and configurations. These different
meanings must be validated in terms of establishing relationships to
face-selective markers. A given meanings of holistic processing may be
driven by any of the hypothesized mechanisms.
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It remains unclear how these various proposed mechanisms
and measures are related. It could be that all, some, or none
of these holistic mechanisms explain any given combination of
holistic measures.
MULTIPLE MEANINGS
Researchers debate which measures best capture holistic pro-
cessing and what mechanisms best predict those measures. We
anticipate continued stalemate unless researchers recognize that
there are different meanings of holistic processing and are explicit
about the particular meaning they are investigating.
Different measures of holistic processing cluster into differ-
ent categories that reflect different aspects of what it might mean
for face recognition to be “holistic” (Figure 1). Some measures
overlap with multiple meanings. For example, the composite task
illustrates a failure to selectively attend to a face part – one empir-
ical signature of holistic face recognition – but alignment of parts
is often manipulated in this task, tapping into another empirical
signature, sensitivity to configuration.
Having multiple measures for a single theoretical construct
is important to establish convergent validity. But convergence
between measures is not expected if they map onto different mean-
ings. By itself, this statement seems obvious. But we often see
arguments that two measures should be related simply because
they are both tagged with the term “holistic processing,” without
considering that there could be divergent meanings to the term
“holistic.”
For example, consider research comparing the part-whole task
and the composite task (Wang et al., 2012; DeGutis et al., 2013).
Although both tasks ostensibly measure “holistic processing,” it is
not clear how they relate to one another: in the part-whole task,
holistic processing is reflected by an advantage making judgments
of the whole compared to individual parts; participants are never
asked to ignore part of a face. In the composite task, participants
must selectively judge one part while actively ignoring another
part. It is logically possible to perform better when a whole face
context is available (whole-part advantage), while also ignoring
that face context if instructed to do so (no composite effect). These
tasks may tap into two different possible meanings of holistic pro-
cessing – the whole is greater than the sum of its parts versus a
failure of selective attention. Performance on these tasks could be
correlated if they are driven by the same underlying mechanism,
which may or may not be the case.
Conversely, we might expect correlations between tasks that
are grouped together under the same meaning. For example,
we might expect a correlation between the face inversion effect
and the Thatcher effect if they both measure sensitivity to
configuration.
Figure 1 illustrates a number of possible meanings of holis-
tic processing. We can ask whether there are costs to selectively
attending to one face part, whether configural cues in faces are
particularly important, or whether a whole face is greater than the
sum of its parts. But we also need to ask these questions about
non-face objects. After all, understanding how face recognition and
object recognition differ – what makes faces “special” – is often
what motivated researchers to study holistic processing in the first
place (e.g., Tanaka and Farah, 1993).
It is not uncommon for purported measures of holistic pro-
cessing to be applied to faces but not objects; this includes the
integration index of Gold et al. (2012), component versus con-
figuration variant of the Garner paradigm (Amishav and Kimchi,
2010), and the recent iHybrid technique (Miellet et al., 2011).
Without testing these measures on non-face objects, it remains
unknown whether the meanings of holistic processing they tap
into reflect what is special to face recognition or more general
properties of object recognition.
For example, consider the Thatcher Illusion (Thompson, 1980),
where it is remarkably difficult to detect whether local features
(e.g., eyes) have been inverted when the entire face is inverted.
When that same face is presented upright, the inverted local fea-
tures are obvious – the face looks hideous. Apart from being an
engaging demo for an introductory psychology course, interest in
the Thatcher illusion partly centers on its seeming face-specific
nature. Yet the illusion for faces is not exceptionally large com-
pared to the distribution of analogous effects obtained across many
non-face categories (Wong et al., 2010).
In the process of comparing faces to objects, it is important
to recognize that people differ markedly on their ability to rec-
ognize different categories of non-face objects. The distribution
of the Thatcher illusion observed with non-face objects is just a
manifestation of a general principle: finding that face and object
recognition are associated or dissociated visual abilities depends
on what object categories are contrasted with faces (McGugin
et al., 2012). Studies finding larger composite effects for faces than
objects suffer from the same limitation: only one non-face object
category is used (e.g., Cassia et al., 2009).
The Thatcher illusion is also only one of many face mea-
sures that compare upright versus inverted face recognition. A
classic finding is that inversion disproportionately disrupts face
recognition compared to recognition of other objects (Yin, 1969).
This quantitative difference between upright and inverted face has
sometimes been taken as evidence for a qualitative difference –
upright faces are recognized holistically and inverted faces are not.
But Richler et al. (2011c) found that both upright and inverted
faces are processed holistically, based on meaning of holistic pro-
cessing grounded in a failure of selective attention measured using
the complete design composite task. This finding has led some
to suggest that this meaning and measure must not reflect “true”
holistic processing because they do not reveal a qualitative dif-
ference between upright and inverted faces (e.g., Palermo et al.,
2011). This,however,presumes that the difference between upright
and inverted face recognition must be qualitative. Importantly,
Richler et al. did find that upright and inverted faces differ in
holistic processing when processing time is considered, indica-
tive of a quantitative difference between upright and inverted face
recognition.
Besides differences between faces and objects or upright and
inverted faces, other criteria can help assess meanings of holis-
tic processing. For example, to what degree are certain meanings
of holistic processing related to face-selective markers like FFA
activity (Weiner and Grill-Spector, 2011) or N170 modulation
(Bentin et al., 1996)? How does holistic processing vary with
performance on the Cambridge Face Memory Task (Duchaine
and Nakayama, 2006), increasingly considered a gold standard
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for measuring individual differences in face recognition (Wilmer
et al., 2010; Germine et al., 2011)? If holistic processing makes
face recognition special, as suggested since the earliest mentions
of holism in the context of faces, then it might be related to mod-
ulation of brain activity in face-specific regions and variability in
face recognition abilities. Considering these relationships harkens
to classic discussions of establishing construct validity by connect-
ing theoretical constructs with empirical measures (Cronbach and
Meehl, 1955).
HOLISTIC PROCESSING AS A FAILURE OF SELECTIVE
ATTENTION
Understanding a concept like holistic processing demands main-
taining distinctions and establishing connections at various levels.
We illustrate this now with reference to some of our own work
on holistic processing that uses the complete design compos-
ite task to test a meaning of holistic processing as a failure of
selective attention. This measure has good construct validity: it
captures differences between objects and faces (Farah et al., 1998;
Richler et al., 2011c), correlates with face-selective neural mark-
ers (Gauthier and Tarr, 2002; Gauthier et al., 2003; Wong et al.,
2009b), and predicts face recognition performance (Richler et al.,
2011a; McGugin et al., 2012; DeGutis et al., 2013). Furthermore,
it suggests possible origins of holistic face processing1, since these
failures of selective attention increase with expertise with non-
face objects (Wong et al., 2009a; Bukach et al., 2010; Boggan et al.,
2012).
Other seemingly similar measures may not meet these crite-
ria. For example, holistic processing measured with the partial
design composite task (e.g., Michel et al., 2006; Wang et al., 2012)
is modulated by manipulations that theoretically should influ-
ence response bias but not holistic processing, such as deceptive
instructions regarding the proportion of “same” trials (Richler
et al., 2011b). This suggests that the partial design may have less
value in efforts to relate individual differences in markers of holis-
tic processing to one another (Wang et al., 2012) or to neural
markers (Jacques and Rossion, 2009; Schiltz et al., 2010) since it
does not capture a putatively stable ability.
Behaviorally, holistic processing within the composite task is
characterized as a failure of selective attention. But it is critical to
recognize that meanings like “failures of selective attention,”“sen-
sitivity to configuration,” or “the whole is greater than the sum
of its parts” do not map one-to-one onto possible mechanisms.
Many diverse empirical findings could emerge because faces are
represented in terms of global face templates and/or because face
recognition engenders inflexible attentional weightings.
For example, while it can be alluring to directly map per-
formance in the partial design composite task onto global face
templates (e.g., Young et al., 1987; Robbins and McKone, 2007)
and behavior in the complete design composite task onto inflex-
ible attentional weightings, we believe that making behavior-
mechanism mappings requires a combination of computational
modeling and converging empirical evidence. It is premature to
1Note that to date developmental studies examining composite effects in children
have only used the partial design composite task (e.g., Mondloch et al., 2007; Cassia
et al., 2009).
infer a particular mechanism only on the basis of observing a par-
ticular behavioral effect (e.g., Michel et al., 2006, 2007; Ramon
et al., 2010; Palermo et al., 2011), without testing whether that
mechanism actually predicts that observed behavior. The language
used to describe empirical effects needs to remain distinct from the
language used to describe mechanisms. The composite effect on
its own does not speak to any particular underlying mechanism,
regardless of how it is verbally described.
Indeed, models that assume that faces are represented by rela-
tively holistic, template-like representations (Cottrell et al., 2002;
see Palmeri and Cottrell, 2009) and models that assume that faces
are represented by orthogonal dimensions representing face parts
can both predict behavior in the composite task (Richler et al.,
2007). Furthermore, behaviors that seem to suggest a mechanistic
model assuming a decisional locus of holistic effects (Wenger and
Ingvalson, 2002; Richler et al., 2008a) can also be mirrored by a
mechanistic model assuming a perceptual locus, rendering results
about perceptual versus decisional loci inconclusive (Mack et al.,
2011; Silbert and Thomas, 2012). So the mapping between mea-
sures and mechanisms is not necessarily one-to-one (see also Ross
et al., in preparation), even when language suggests otherwise.
Failure of selective attention in face recognition can arise mech-
anistically because of the representational constraints of a global
face template or because of inflexibility in attentional weightings
on face parts. We favor the latter based on emerging empirical
evidence. For example, when face and novel object composites
are interleaved, novel objects are processed more holistically when
preceded by an aligned face, which is processed holistically, than a
misaligned face, which is not (Richler et al., 2009). This is difficult
to explain by a face template. How would a unified perceptual rep-
resentation of an aligned face impact processing of a subsequent
novel object that does not share the same configuration of fea-
tures? These results seem more consistent with holistic processing
being a consequence of a perceptual strategy that is automati-
cally recruited for the aligned face stimulus and remains in play
when a novel object is processed. Other studies suggest that failures
of selective attention in the composite task can be influenced by
inducing global or local processing biases (Gao et al., 2011; Curby
et al., 2012), hinting that holistic processing could be the outcome
of an attentional strategy. While it is not clear mechanistically how
these effects emerge, it is premature to equate holistic processing
with holistic representations.
CONCLUSION
Holistic processing can mean many different things, and all mean-
ings are not created equal: some may not distinguish face and
object processing, predict neural markers or individual differences,
or manifest themselves in behavior despite being reasonable def-
initions for how face processing could be “holistic.” At present,
holistic processing as a failure of selective attention seems the
strongest candidate. Certainly holistic processing may be con-
ceptualized in other ways, and better measures and mechanistic
models may be developed. Currently, other meanings lack crit-
ical evidence, in many cases simply because these relationships
have not yet been tested. Multiple meanings of holistic processing
may turn out to be valid, and several may eventually merge into
an overarching construct on the basis of empirical studies and
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computational modeling. Using “holistic processing” as a blanket
term for all possible meanings is a challenge for the field, leading
researchers to expect that a variety of markers of holistic process-
ing should all be related when they may not measure the same
construct and may be driven by different mechanisms. We cannot
change the words people use, but we urge people to recognize the
different ways holistic processing can refer to different meanings,
mechanisms, and measures.
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